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Weaving Together Culture and Cognition: An Illustration 
from Madagascar1 
Rita Astuti? 
ABSTRACT: This paper presents the results of an interdisciplinary collaboration 
between an anthropologist and two cognitive developmental psychologists. It pits the 
anthropological study of cultural representations against the psychological study of 
innate representational constraints. More specifically, it pits the ethnographic account 
of how Vezo adults in Madagascar describe the processes by which babies come to 
resemble people other than their birth parents against the claim that the development 
of concepts of birth parentage and biological inheritance is guided by innate con-
straints. Once woven together, the two accounts raise issues of theoretical import for 
both the anthropological study of culture and the psychological study of cognition and 
cognitive development.  
In the last decade the problematic relationship between the study of mind 
and the study of culture has attracted increased attention. Whereas Hutchins 
(1995) has shown how culture was relegated to a peripheral role in the study of 
cognition – as Cole (1996, p. 327) puts it, “Why has it proven so difficult for 
psychologists to keep culture in mind?” – Shore (1996) has demonstrated how 
anthropology achieved its independence from psychology by establishing 
culture as the content of mind rather than one of its defining attributes. 
Acknowledging the contemporary relevance of this history, Strauss and Quinn 
(1997) have felt the need to pre-empt various forms of “anthropological 
resistance” to the proposition that the study of cultural meanings must include 
the study of how the human mind works. Still, despite the fact that the histories 
of both disciplines have converged in separating mind from culture, there has 
been a growing recognition on both sides that the human mind cannot be 
studied independently of the cultural context in which it develops, and that 
cultural knowledge cannot be studied without reference to the cognitive 
organisation and development of individual minds (e.g., Bloch, 1998; Boyer, 
1994; Cole, 1996; Hirschfeld, 1988; Hutchins, 1995; Shweder and al., 1998; 
Shore, 1996; Sperber, 1996; Strauss & Quinn,1997; The Journal of Cognition 
and Culture, 2001; Toren, 1999; Whitehouse, 1996). 
                                                 
1 This article is based on research undertaken in Madagascar in 1998 funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (Grant R000237191) and the Nuffield Foundation (Social Science Research 
Foundation Fellowship, 1997-98). Data analysis was undertaken during a sabbatical year at the 
Laboratory of Developmental Studies, Harvard University, funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (Research Fellowship R000271254, 2002-2005) and the Leverhulme Foundation 
(Study Abroad Fellowship, 2002-03). I wish to thank all these institutions for their generous support. 
The data presented in this chapter are part of a larger collaborative project between anthropologists and 
cognitive psychologists – Maurice Bloch (London School of Economics), Susan Carey (Harvard), 
Gregg Solomon (National Science Foundation) and myself. 
? Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE, UK. r.astuti@lse.ac.uk, phone: 00 44 20 79557206, fax: 00 44 20 79557603. 
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Of course, it is one thing for anthropologists and psychologists to recognize 
the need to combine the study of culture and cognition, and it is another thing 
to implement a programme of interdisciplinary research that overcomes the 
very real methodological and theoretical barriers that stand in its way. This 
paper is about the results of one such implementation, when an anthropologist 
trained in traditional ethnographic methods and inclined to find radically 
different conceptual understandings across cultural contexts teamed up with 
two cognitive developmental psychologists trained in experimental methods 
and inclined to uncover cross-cultural universality in children’s and adults’ 
representations of the world. The paper starts with their two distinctive threads 
and develops by weaving them together. Hopefully, it will become apparent 
that the methodological and theoretical efforts involved in this collaboration 
have been worthwhile.2 
THE ANTHROPOLOGIST’S ACCOUNT 
Imagine being an anthropologist doing fieldwork in Betania, a village of 
Vezo fishing people on the western coast of Madagascar. You have learnt the 
language and over time local people have grown to trust you. They let you 
participate in their daily activities and they have stopped marvelling at your 
ability to utter the simplest of greetings, to walk any distance without gasping, 
or to eat the local food without choking. You have gradually become part of 
their everyday landscape. Little by little, you have been plugged into the 
village social network: you attend funerals and other mortuary rituals, you are 
invited to “marriages” and you visit women who have just given birth. Let me 
take you through one such visit. 
You slowly approach the house and call out your greeting. From inside the 
house, the women who attend to mother and baby respond by inviting you in. 
You enter and you are struck by the darkness and the stuffiness of the 
atmosphere. The mother is lying on the bed and next to her is the baby. You 
can just about make out their shapes, as they are individually wrapped up in 
layers of blankets, with the two bundles being in turn wrapped together in what 
looks like a gigantic cocoon. The blankets are not just meant to keep mother 
and baby hot. Even more importantly, they are meant to insulate them from the 
dangerous “winds” that could enter their wounded bodies, through the vagina 
in the case of the mother and through the navel in the case of the baby.  
You’ll be allowed to take a peep at the baby and you might be invited to 
hold it, securely wrapped up in its bundle. As you stare in awe at the perfectly 
formed face, at the beautifully smooth skin, at the quivering lips, you will be 
surprised to hear that the people around you, whether visitors or hosts, are busy 
telling each other how very ugly the new born baby is. They say it very 
emphatically (r-a-a-a-ty zaza ty), so emphatically that you can sense that they 
do not really mean it. Indeed, if you later challenge people and ask them why 
they said that the newborn baby was ugly, they will explain that one does not 
want to bring bad luck on the baby by saying that it looks beautiful, healthy, 
and chubby. Compliments call for trouble, as if one were drawing the attention 
of powerful forces, such as disaffected ancestors, which may intervene to 
transform good looking, healthy, and chubby babies into ugly, sickly and bony 
ones. 
                                                 
2 For a full account of the results of this collaboration, see Astuti, Solomon & Carey, 2004. For another 
example of fruitful interdisciplinary collaborations, see Medin, Ross & Cox, 2006.  
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This explanation fits in with people’s acute awareness of the fact that babies 
are extremely vulnerable and in need of constant protection: keeping them 
wrapped up in layers of blankets and saying that they are ugly appear to be 
elements of the same safeguarding strategy. And yet, as you try to remember to 
say that a stunningly beautiful baby is very ugly, you are bound to notice what 
people do not say about the baby, namely that she has taken after her mother in 
this feature and after her father in that feature. Let me pursue this absence 
further. 
If you were to investigate how babies are thought to come into being, you 
will discover that Vezo stipulate a strong bodily connection between the child 
and both parents who have generated it (see Astuti, 1993 for details). 
Nonetheless, when asked to explain how babies turn out to look the way they 
do (e.g. big eyes, light skin, bent nose, etc.), Vezo adults, as other people in 
Madagascar and indeed as people in other parts of the world, invoke 
mechanisms other than procreation, and the contribution of people other than 
the baby’s birth parents (see e.g., Bloch, 1993 and Thomas, 1999 for other 
Malagasy examples; Carsten, 1991, p. 431, for a Malay example; Stafford, 
personal communication for a Chinese example). 
 For example, if a pregnant woman takes a strong dislike for someone, 
whether related to her or not, her baby will come to resemble the disliked 
person. By contrast, spending a lot of time with, or even just thinking a lot 
about someone during pregnancy, will cause the child to look like the 
frequented person. If a pregnant woman has a lover, the lover will “steal” some 
of the baby’s facial traits, which means that the baby’s face will bear some 
signs of its mother’s relationship. More seriously: why was that child born with 
a clubfoot? Because when his mother was a child she used to tease one of her 
contemporaries who had a clubfoot, the result of a badly administered quinine 
injection. When she gave birth, she was shocked to see that her baby had an 
identical defect to the one she used to make fun of. Even after birth, a baby’s 
physiognomy can be altered by the visitation of a variety of wandering spirits; 
if the baby is left alone and is approached by a spirit, the encounter will result 
in the reshaping of the baby’s face. Such spirits have an easy job because 
babies are wobbly, bendable and boneless. 
These observations suggest that the reason Vezo do not remark on the 
resemblance between babies and their birth parents is that the perceived 
mechanisms by which people come to acquire their physical characteristics 
locate the resemblance elsewhere – between those who are related through 
social intercourse, rather than between those who share a bodily connection 
through conception and birth. In turn, this conclusion suggests that, more 
generally, Vezo do not make the ontological distinction between the baby as a 
biological organism and its social personhood. It is indeed difficult to see 
where one would begin and the other one end, given that social causes – such 
as teasing or spending time together – are said to shape the baby’s organic 
make up. By implication, the distinction between birth (as a biological process) 
and nurture (as a social process) is also blurred, in so far as biological 
parenthood is socialized (as evidenced by the many people the baby will 
resemble) and nurturing relations are somatized (because of the effect that 
nurture has on the baby’s bodily make-up). 
This conclusion sits comfortably with mainstream anthropological 
theorizing, and the extremely influential claim in the anthropological literature 
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on kinship – or rather, on the critique of the study of kinship (Schneider, 1984) 
– that non-Western peoples such as the Vezo do not recognize the ontological 
distinction between “facts of biology” and “facts of sociality” (e.g., Ingold, 
1991, p. 362 for a particularly clear formulation of this point). This claim has 
been central to the demise of traditional kinship studies (Schneider, 1984; 
Carsten, 2000), which were accused of naively assuming that the reported 
diversity in kinship systems (e.g., matrilineal versus patrilineal descent) was 
due to the cultural variations in the interpretations of the same natural facts. 
Instead, “the notion of a pure, pristine state of biological relationships ‘out 
there in reality’ which is the same for all mankind is sheer nonsense” 
(Schneider, 1965, p. 97). 
THE PSYCHOLOGIST’S ACCOUNT  
Now imagine being a psychologist. You are open to the possibility that in 
some domains of knowledge human conceptual development is guided by 
innate constraints and you want to establish whether folkbiology is one of the 
domains that are so constrained, as suggested by some (e.g., Atran, 1998; 
Atran and al., 1997; Lopez and al., 1997; Medin & Atran, 2004). Accordingly, 
you are interested in cross-cultural studies of conceptual development and its 
adult endpoint, because such studies can ensure that what are described as 
universal habits of mind actually apply beyond the minds of urban, middle-
class Euro-Americans that are the subjects of most cognitive studies (e.g. 
Coley, 2000; Diesendruk, 2001; Walker, 1999). From this perspective, the 
conclusion reached by the anthropological investigation among the Vezo is 
very significant: if it is true that Vezo adults do not recognize the ontological 
distinction between facts of biology and facts of sociality, then the proposal 
that there is “a folk biological system (FBS) of the human mind that 
discriminates and categorizes parts of the flux of human experience as 
‘biological’ and develops complex abilities to infer and interpret this 
structured, core cognitive domain” (Medin & Atran, 2004: 961) must be called 
into question. Similarly, the ethnographic description of how Vezo adults 
account for their babies’ physiognomy challenges the claim that concepts such 
as birth parentage and biological inheritance are innately constrained, for if so 
we would expect them to be cross-culturally universal. 
Nonetheless, as a psychologist, you are likely to be suspicious of the kind 
of evidence that is adduced to make the radical anthropological claim of 
ontological incommensurability. Not only is the evidence anecdotal. It is also 
of a very specific kind, consisting as it does of culturally codified statements 
about the ugliness of newborn babies or the likely consequences of teasing 
some one with a crooked foot. Aware of the potential discrepancy between the 
intuitions that guide people’s automatic inferences and the knowledge that 
people elaborate through cultural learning and self-reflection (e.g., Barrett 
1998), what you require as evidence that Vezo adults do not differentiate 
between facts of biology and facts of sociality is the absence of this distinction 
in their inferential reasoning. 
You team up with an anthropologist who has extended fieldwork 
experience in a Vezo community in order to avoid the flaws of “parachuting 
psychology” – the practice of “parachuting” experimental psychologists in the 
midst of exotic populations they know far too little about. She will recruit 
trusting and cooperative villagers and will ask them to take part in a simple 
experimental procedure, the so-called adoption task, that will target people’s 
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understanding of the process of biological inheritance. This procedure was 
originally designed to explore North American children’s understanding of 
family resemblance and of the differential role that procreation and nurture 
play in the transmission of properties from parents to offspring (Solomon and 
al., 1996). Like most tasks used by developmental psychologists, the adoption 
task was designed with the following consideration in mind: young children’s 
knowledge is systematically underestimated if it is assessed by verbal 
production tasks, since children are typically unable to self-reflectively 
describe what they know. Therefore, to establish that young children (or pre-
linguistic infants) master certain numerical, physical, psychological or 
biological concepts, developmental psychologists design experimental 
techniques that require young participants to choose between different 
outcomes (by looking, pointing, reaching, answering simple forced-choice 
questions), but do not expect them to be able to explain why they do so. The 
experimenter infers from their responses the knowledge that the children must 
have (or lack) to come to that particular conclusion. 
In the case of the adoption task, children are told a simple story about a 
baby born to one set of parents and raised by another. One of the birth parents 
is then attributed a certain property, while one of the adoptive parents is 
attributed another contrastive property. Children have to answer the following 
question: once the baby is fully grown up, will s/he resemble the birth or the 
adoptive parent on that property? In other words, they have to make a simple 
similarity judgement. Crucially, the task presents them with two distinct kinds 
of properties: bodily properties on the one hand (e.g., having blond as opposed 
to dark hair), and mental properties, such as beliefs, on the other (e.g., 
believing that skunks can see in the dark as opposed to believing that skunks 
cannot see in the dark). If children judge that the adopted child will resemble 
the birth parent on bodily properties (because such properties are inherited 
through biological descent) and the adoptive parent on mental properties 
(because such properties are acquired through learning and habituation) one 
can infer that they, like North-American adults, have come to differentiate 
between two distinct causal mechanisms for the transmission of two 
ontologically distinct properties of the person, and can thus be credited with a 
causal understanding of biological inheritance as distinct from social learning. 
The characteristics that make the adoption task an appropriate tool for 
working with children make it equally useful for working with Vezo adults 
who are quite adept at systematizing and verbalizing their views about the 
world. Specifically, the advantage of using the adoption task to explore how 
Vezo adults construe the process of biological inheritance is that it does not 
directly tap into their stock cultural knowledge. Notably, the adoption task sets 
out a hypothetical scenario – a riddle – which can be kept as culture-neutral as 
possible. For example, the story can be told in such a way that it does not 
evoke the social and moral setting in which Vezo adoption normally takes 
place (i.e., among close relatives), and the traits for the resemblance questions 
can be chosen so as to be value free (e.g., bodily characteristics that people 
consider neither desirable nor unattractive; beliefs which carry no obvious truth 
value). By virtue of their sheer oddity (see below), the resemblance questions 
do not prime participants’ beliefs about the plasticity of babies’ physiognomy 
or their narratives about the role of social relations in shaping the organic 
make-up of the person. Instead, they force participants to figure out the answer 
to entirely novel questions. 
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What happens, then, when Vezo adults participate in the adoption task and 
are asked to judge whether the adopted boy would resemble his birth or 
adoptive father on bodily properties, beliefs and skills?3 The first thing to be 
said is that they were initially rather doubtful about the seriousness of the 
exercise. Betania villagers are pretty used to having their resident 
anthropologist relentlessly asking all sorts of questions, but they were not 
prepared for questions of this kind: 
The father4 who generated the child (baba niteraky azy) believed that 
chameleons have 30 teeth, whereas the father who raised the child (baba niteza 
azy) believed that chameleons have 20 teeth. In your opinion, when the child is 
fully grown up, will he believe that chameleons have 30 teeth like the father 
who generated him or will he believe that chameleons have 20 teeth like the 
father who raised him? 
Villagers were visibly puzzled by the procedure. Nonetheless, by the time 
they got half way through the task – when they had realized that only some of 
the questions were about the adopted child’s mind or character (sainy, toetsiny) 
while the others were about his physical appearance (vatany)5 – they became 
visibly more engaged. There were at this moment clear signs of recognition 
(e.g., “Now I can see what this is all about!”) as participants saw the point of 
what had seemed until then a pointless conversation. What they saw, half way 
through the task, was that the questions were not aimed at finding out the 
obvious, i.e. whether babies get their looks from the parents who generated 
them (for those who were first presented with the set of questions about bodily 
traits), or whether people come to believe what they are taught by their parents 
(for those who were first presented with the set of questions about beliefs).6 
Rather, what the questions were trying to find out was whether there is any 
difference between the way children come to have their parents’ looks and the 
way they come to share their parents’ beliefs and skills. Nothing in the task 
forced participants to get this point, but they overwhelmingly did.  
Participants’ overall performance can be captured by analyzing their 
individual patterns of judgments. Following Solomon and al. (1996), 
participants are said to have shown a Differentiated Pattern, if they judge that 
the adopted child would resemble the birth parent on most of the bodily traits 
and the adoptive father on most of the beliefs (their judgments on skills were 
not considered in determining the Differentiated pattern); they are said to have 
shown a Birth Parent Bias, if they judge that the adopted child would resemble 
the birth parent on all or almost all traits (bodily properties, beliefs and skills); 
                                                 
3 The adoption task was first successfully used by Bloch among the Zafimaniry of Madagascar (Bloch, 
Solomon & Carey, 2001).  
4 A control task was designed to establish whether participants might reason differently depending on 
whether the link of filiation targeted by the questions was paternal or maternal; there was no evidence of 
a systematic effect and therefore in what follows I ignore this variable. 
5 The study was balanced across participants according to a Latin-Square design in order to control for 
the potential confounding factors of whether the bodily traits were presented before or after the beliefs, 
and which value of a pair of features was attributed to the birth parent. Thus, half of the participants 
were first asked the questions about the resemblance on bodily traits, while the other half were first 
asked the questions about the resemblance on beliefs (the questions about skills were always presented 
last). 
6 Note, however, that there was no order effect. This means that participants responded to the first set of 
questions they were presented (either about bodily traits or about beliefs) irrespective of the insight they 
were going to gain half way through the task.  
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they are said to have shown an Adoptive Parent Bias if they judge that the 
adopted child would resemble the adoptive parent on all or almost all traits 
(bodily properties, beliefs and skills). Finally, participants who do not show 
any of the above patterns are said to have shown a Mixed Pattern.  
An overwhelming 77 percent of Vezo adult participants showed a 
Differentiated Pattern.7 For this pattern of judgments to emerge, participants 
must have reasoned that bodily properties are inherited through links of 
filiation (hence the child’s resemblance to the birth parent), and that beliefs are 
transmitted through learning and teaching (hence the child’s resemblance to the 
adoptive parent). This finding suggests that Vezo adults differentiate between 
two causal mechanisms (one having to do with generating children, the other 
one having to do with nurturing them) for the transmission of two distinct 
kinds of properties (bodily traits and beliefs).  
This finding proved to be very robust. The adoption scenario was 
manipulated in a number of ways, for example by making the birth and 
adoptive parents either Vezo or Masikoro (the Vezo’s agricultural neighbours) 
or Vezo and Karany (town-dwellers of Indo-Pakistani descent). More 
significantly, in one follow-up study the scenario closely matched the kinship 
arrangements that are normally mobilized in actual cases of adoption (the birth 
and adoptive parents were the children of two sisters). But none of these 
manipulations had any effect. In all cases, the overwhelming majority of 
participants showed a Differentiated Pattern (see Astuti and al., 2004, and 
Astuti, Solomon & Carey, in preparation). 
These results are evidence that Vezo adults have constructed a concept of 
biological inheritance as distinct from a concept of social learning and, more 
generally, that they draw the ontological distinction between “facts of biology” 
and “facts of sociality”. Obviously, this conclusion does not entail that the 
concepts of “biological inheritance” and “social learning” held by Vezo adults 
map exactly onto the equivalent set of concepts held by Euro American adults. 
Given the different intellectual traditions and socio-economic contexts in 
which these concepts get constructed, this claim would be daft (for example, 
there is no evidence that Vezo adults are familiar with western accounts of 
biological inheritance in terms of genetic coding). Nonetheless, the evidence 
suggests that Vezo and Euro American concepts of biological inheritance and 
social learning are commensurable to one another, in so far as they play the 
same inferential role in adult reasoning about family resemblance.  
This is confirmed by the spontaneous justifications that participants offered 
in support of their judgments, which provide a more qualitative picture of their 
causal reasoning. Below are some extracts from the protocols of a few adults 
who showed a Differentiated Pattern.8 Since the task was very repetitive, 
participants provided justifications only for a selection of their judgements; for 
each justification, the traits for which it was given are indicated in brackets. 
                                                 
7 Of the remaining participants, 6 percent showed a Birth Parent Bias, 3 percent an Adoptive Parent 
Bias, and 13 percent a Mixed Pattern. For complete statistical analyses, see Astuti and al., 2004. 
8 The complete quantitative and qualitative analysis of all the justifications can be found in Astuti and 
al., 2004. A sample of complete protocols by adult participants who showed Differentiated, Birth Parent 
Bias, Adoptive Parent Bias, and Mixed Patterns can be found at 
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/pdfs/vezo.pdf. 
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23 years old, male informant 
[The father who generated the child believed that papaya is 
healthier than pineapple; the father who raised the child 
believed that pineapple is healthier than papaya]: He’ll be 
like the father who raised him because he grew up here 
[in the adoptive parents’ village], and his thoughts grew 
apart from the other father. 
[The father who generate the child was crossed eyed; the 
father who raised the child had straight eyes]: He’ll be like 
his father, because he is the one who generated him and 
for this reason the boy’s face will be like his. 
49 years old, male informant 
[The father who generated the child had roundish ears; the 
father who raised the child had pointed ears]: Like the father 
who generated him. When it comes to believing things, the 
child will follow the father who raised him, but when it 
comes to the ways of his body (fombam-batany) this will 
depend on the father who generated him. These things are 
determined by one’s blood (mandeha aminy ra). 
60 years old, male informant 
[The father who generated the child believed that cows have 
stronger teeth than horses; the father who raised the boy 
believed that horses have stronger teeth than cows]: Like 
the father who raised him because the thoughts of those 
who raise him have power/influence over him. They are 
the “owners” of the child (tompony) since the child 
would not be alive if it were not for them. And yet the 
parents who generated him also have power/influence 
since if it weren’t for them he would not have come out 
onto this earth. 
[The father who generated him had pointed ears; the father 
who raised him had roundish ears]: Like the father who 
generated him, because that’s where the child gets his 
template (modely) from. 
49 years old, female informant 
[The father who generated him had a flat appendix; the 
father who raised him had a roundish appendix]: He will 
look only like the father who generated him. In his body 
(am-batany) he will be like the one who generated him. 
[The father who generated him believed that chameleons 
have 30 teeth; the father who raised him believed that cha-
meleons have 20 teeth]: Like the father who raised him 
because this is about his character (toetsiny) and not 
about his body (vatany), and he will believe like the 
father who brought him up because he hears his words. 
These statements are significant for at least two reasons. First, they confirm 
that the coding of participants’ resemblance judgments captures something 
important about their reasoning strategy. Vezo adults who showed a 
Differentiated Pattern in their judgments could not have been more articulate in 
identifying the difference between a person’s character and ways of thinking, 
which are acquired through listening, looking, learning, growing up with 
someone, and the properties of the body, which are acquired through the 
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“template” that is passed on through procreation. Second, the justifications 
demonstrate that the conceptual knowledge Vezo adults drew upon when 
answering the resemblance questions is readily available to their conscious 
scrutiny and verbal elaboration. They did not find it in any way difficult to put 
their causal reasoning into words (as one might imagine they would if, for 
example, they were asked to reflect on certain aspects of their spatial or 
linguistic knowledge). In many ways, the justifications reveal that Vezo adults 
found the task somewhat obvious, and the reasoning necessary to solve it 
positively transparent. 
WEAVING THE TWO ACCOUNTS TOGETHER: THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR 
ANTHROPOLOGISTS 
We are thus faced with an alarming discrepancy between the conclusion 
reached through the practice of interpretative ethnography and the conclusion 
reached by targeting Vezo adults’ inferential reasoning. On one account, Vezo 
disallow the distinction between organism and social person, between 
biological inheritance and socially mediated learning; on the other account, 
Vezo use these distinctions productively to predict how individual properties 
get transmitted from parents to offspring. 
Many anthropologists are simply going to dismiss the findings of the 
adoption task, because they see a suspicious similarity between the ontological 
commitments of the researcher and the ontological distinctions allegedly made 
by Vezo adults (see Ingold, 2004; McKinnon, 2002). On this view, the finding 
that Vezo differentiate between what is inborn and what is learnt, between birth 
and adoption, between bodily and mental properties is a misleading fabrication, 
the inevitable outcome of a naïve methodology coupled with theoretical 
preconceptions. This, however, is a spurious argument, for although the 
adoption task is undoubtedly constructed around the distinctions that it aims to 
reveal, it cannot impose them on the participants. If participants do not 
differentiate between birth and adoptive parents, between birth and nurture, 
between bodily and mental traits, they will proceed through the task blissfully 
unaware of the distinctions being probed, free to use a number of alternative, 
non-dualistic reasoning strategies (e.g., the child will resemble the adoptive 
parents on all traits because of its extreme malleability; the “true” parent is the 
one that generates, and the child will therefore resemble him on all traits; the 
“true” parent is the one that adopts, and the child will therefore resemble him 
on all traits; the child will have whichever trait seems truer or preferable, 
irrespective of whether it is the trait attributed to the birth or adoptive parent; 
etc.).9 
But what are we to make of the discovery that Vezo adults have constructed 
an understanding of biological inheritance and that they know why offspring 
resemble their birth parents in their physiognomy? Clearly, as far as the 
interpretive aim of anthropology is concerned, one is left with the task of 
explaining why, if Vezo adults know that human physiognomy is determined 
                                                 
9 That the adoption task does not have the magical power to impose dualistic categories onto a monistic 
mind is no vacuous speculation. As discussed in the next section, when used with young children, the 
adoption task has consistently failed to detect any differentiation between inherited and acquired 
properties, between birth and social parents, between “facts of biology” and “facts of sociality”. In other 
words, the adoption task is a sensitive diagnostic tool: if participants are not “infected” by dualistic 
reasoning, they will not test positive. 
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by the “template” that babies inherit from the parents who generated them, they 
insist that their children resemble people other than their birth parents. In what 
follows I shall propose an explanation, and I will relate it to the findings of the 
adoption task. 
Let me start from an observation that is probably familiar to most readers. 
When people in England say, as they do, that my son resembles his father and 
me (e.g., he has taken after his father in the shape of his mouth, and after me in 
the shape of his eyes), they establish our exclusive claims as his parents. We 
would find it odd if someone said, as Vezo people would, that my son 
resembles the yoga instructor I met weekly when I was pregnant. The reason 
we would find it odd is not simply that we do not believe that a baby’s features 
can be affected by the mother’s relationship with her yoga instructor 
(especially if she is a woman!); more profoundly, we would find it odd because 
we do not feel that a yoga instructor should have any claim over her pupil’s 
baby.  
By contrast, what Vezo people would find odd is the suggestion that birth 
parents have exclusive claims over their children, and remarks about the 
resemblance between children and the parents who have generated them would 
be interpreted as a way of suggesting just that. This is why, I suggest, Vezo 
people are not predisposed to see resemblance where its existence is an index 
of a unique and exclusive relationship between parents and their children. 
Instead, the many ways in which babies come to resemble people other than 
their birth parents work to dissolve that uniqueness and exclusivity, by 
socializing parenthood and extending the child’s bodily connections well 
beyond those with its parents.  
This way of (not) seeing resemblance is just one instance of a much wider 
strategy. As argued elsewhere (Astuti, 2000), the notion that children “belong” 
to more people than their birth parents (and that grandchildren and great 
grandchildren “belong” to more people than their grandparents and great 
grandparents) is central to Vezo kinship and to the realization of people’s most 
valued aim in life: to reach old age surrounded by a vast number of 
descendants. While this objective is inherent to the Vezo undifferentiated 
system of kinship reckoning, which is inclusive rather than exclusive, people 
also actively pursue this end in their everyday practices. For example, although 
children tend to be raised by their birth parents, it is considered unforgivingly 
rude for such parents to assert their unique rights or duties over their children.10 
By contrast, every effort is made to break down the boundaries that demarcate 
individual family units – for example, by encouraging children to eat from any 
of the kitchens of their numerous “parents” (e.g., mother’s sisters, mother’s 
brothers, father’s sisters, father’s brothers, and so on).11 Although there is a 
                                                 
10 The only context when this is admissible is when ancestral matters are concerned, such as the 
decision to perform the ritual that establishes exclusive rights over one’s children’s dead bodies (see 
Astuti, 1995a for further details).  
11 This behaviour is common throughout Madagascar (e.g., Bloch, 1971, p. 83) and it extends to 
children’s sleeping arrangements. Bloch (personal communication) reports that during his fieldwork 
among the Merina in the highlands of Madagascar, a little boy got lost in the fields. However, since his 
parents assumed that he was staying with some other “parents”, and it would have been considered rude 
for them to look for him, it took some time before the extended family realized that he was actually 
missing. See Bloch (1986) for a general discussion of the way Merina construe biological ties and how 
they overcome their divisiveness through ritual means. 
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well-understood practical advantage in sharing children in this way, an 
important effect of this practice is that it trains children and adults alike to 
disregard the distinctions between one’s birth and other classificatory parents, 
between one’s full and one’s classificatory siblings. Exactly the same effect is 
achieved when people do not attend to the resemblance between babies and 
their birth parents and choose to see it elsewhere. 
During one administration of the adoption task, one of the few participants 
who showed a Birth Parent Bias (that is, he judged that the adopted child 
would resemble the birth parent on all properties) offered a striking 
justification for one of his judgements. He said that the adopted child would 
have pointed ears like his birth father because “in the case of human beings 
there must be a sign, a proof, that your child is yours” (olom-belo tsy maintsy 
misy famantara io anakinao). The results of the adoption task have revealed 
that the majority of Vezo adults are aware that children bear such signs; 
encouraging children to eat and sleep in many different houses and asserting 
that babies’ physiognomy is shaped by the actions of people other than the 
parents who generate them are some of the practices through which the 
majority of Vezo adults strive to erase these signs as best as they can.  
If so, it stands to reason that anthropologists cannot begin to understand the 
motivation behind these practices – to create a community in which children 
are generated, nurtured and moulded by a much larger network of relations 
than the ones demarcated by their birth parents – if they were to assume that 
Vezo ontology is blind to the difference that these ways of eating, sleeping and 
seeing are meant to mitigate. Although at first ethnographic sight it might seem 
that Vezo kinship transcends the distinctions between the “facts of biology” 
and the “facts of sociality”, between physical and social identities, between 
organism and person, the claim that Vezo ontology is monistic is not only 
factually wrong; paradoxically, in making such a claim, anthropologists risk 
ignoring the meaning, moral valence, and psychological force of what Vezo 
adults tell them about their babies. 
WEAVING THE TWO ACCOUNTS TOGETHER: THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR 
PSYCHOLOGISTS 
Our psychologist’s original motivation for joining force with an 
anthropologist was to test the hypothesis that conceptual development in the 
domain of folkbiology might be guided by innate constraints. In so far as it 
revealed a significant degree of convergence in the concepts of birth parentage 
and biological inheritance across radically different cultural contexts, the 
evidence provided by the study with Vezo adults is consistent with this 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, cross-cultural convergence in adult conceptual 
representations does not constitute sufficient evidence that conceptual 
development is innately constrained. This is because, as discussed at greater 
length elsewhere (Astuti and al., 2004), cross-cultural convergence in adults’ 
representations can result from a process of unconstrained learning if the world 
provides consistent and stable data in favour of those representations. In 
addition to cross-cultural convergence in adult representations what is needed, 
therefore, is evidence that the relevant representations emerge early in 
development and that their emergence is impervious to the widely different 
cultural, social and educational environments in which children grow up. From 
this perspective, the collaboration with the anthropologist not only offers the 
opportunity to test for the universality of certain habits of the adult mind, but 
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also to explore whether the manner of constructing such habits is culturally 
inflected. 
As mentioned earlier, the adoption task was originally designed for use with 
North American children. Likewise, the version of the task used to interview 
Vezo adults was presented to Vezo children, aged 6 to 13, and to Vezo 
adolescents, aged 14 to 20. The results indicate that before their mid-teens 
Vezo children understand neither that the biological process of reproduction is 
implicated in the transmission of bodily properties from parents to their 
offspring, nor that the processes of learning, practice and imitation are 
implicated in the transmission of beliefs.12 In other words, 6- to 13-year olds 
have yet to construct the understanding of biological inheritance that is found 
among their parents and elders, and which emerges only from around age 14. 
Vezo children’s overall performance on the adoption task converges with 
that of children who have been tested in North America and Europe (Giménez 
& Harris, 2002; Solomon, 2002; Solomon and al., 1996; Springer, 1996; 
Springer & Keil, 1989; Weissman & Kalish, 1999; Williams & Affleck, 1999), 
in India (Mahalingham, 1998) and in another part of rural Madagascar (Bloch 
and al., 2001) in showing that an understanding of biological inheritance takes 
a considerable time to develop. Nonetheless, the length of time it takes varies 
considerably in these different contexts. Thus, while children in rural 
Madagascar begin to show a Differentiated Pattern at around age 14, urban 
Tamil children in India do so at around age 12, and middle-class children in 
North America at around age 6 or 7. There are likely to be several 
interconnected reasons for why, for example, Vezo children take so much 
longer than North American or European counterparts to construct the concept 
of biological inheritance. These range from Vezo children’s very limited access 
to schooling to Vezo parents’ culturally specific pedagogical expectations and 
practices (see Astuti and al., 2004 for details); but foremost among them is 
probably the fact that the testimony Vezo children receive from their parents 
and elders is precisely aimed at conflating the distinction between the 
biological mechanism of reproduction and the social mechanism of nurture (as 
when Vezo adults assert that a baby’s physical features depend on what kind of 
people her mother befriended or disliked when she was pregnant, see above). 
Taken together, these findings and ethnographic observations indicate that the 
pace with which children construct the concepts of birth parentage and 
biological inheritance is sensitive to the cultural, social and educational 
environments in which they grow up. Furthermore, there is suggestive 
evidence that the steps taken by Vezo children as they construct these concepts 
are also context-dependent.  
Specifically, the analysis of the judgments made on the adoption task by the 
group of adolescents and young adults, aged 14 to 20, reveals that those among 
them who are still in transition from the children’s undifferentiated to the 
adults’ differentiated pattern of reasoning13 have nonetheless made a first 
significant realization: that a person’s skills (such things as knowing how to 
                                                 
12 Only 13 percent of the children showed a Differentiated Pattern. Of the remaining participants in this 
age group, 30 percent showed a Birth Parent Bias, 18 percent an Adoptive Parent Bias, and 40 percent a 
Mixed Pattern. On average, they judged that the adopted boy would resemble his birth parent 58 percent 
of time on bodily traits, 49 percent of the time on beliefs, and 50 percent of the time on skills. See 
Astuti and al., 2004 for more details. 
13 Namely, the 34 percent of adolescents who showed a Mixed Pattern of judgments. 
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make ropes or how to whistle) are learnt, rather than inherited.14 Thus, even if 
they fail to differentiate between bodily properties and beliefs,15 and even if 
their judgments for bodily properties indicate that they are still somewhat 
unsure as to what mechanism is responsible for the physical resemblance 
between parents and their offspring,16 these adolescents reliably differentiate 
between bodily properties and skills (see Astuti and al., 2004 for further 
details). This complex pattern of results suggests that the crucial differentiation 
between properties of the person that are passed on through biological 
processes causally connected with birth and procreation and properties of the 
person that are passed on through social processes of learning and imitation is 
built upon and is driven by the understanding of how skills are acquired. 
An anthropologist familiar with the cultural environment in which these 
conceptual developments unfold will not be surprised by the fact that even 
those adolescents who have yet to fully differentiate the mechanisms that 
determine a person’s individual properties have made significant headway in 
their understanding of how skills are acquired and transmitted. Not only 
adolescents are in the midst of learning skills that are necessary for their 
livelihood, which they are increasingly responsible for providing themselves; 
by learning these skills – fishing, sailing, selling fish, etc. – these young men 
and women are also making themselves Vezo. Adults are adamant that young 
children, despite the fact that they have Vezo parents and are of Vezo descent, 
are not Vezo yet. This is because they are still unable to master the skills that, 
according to the adult theory of social group identity (Astuti, 1995a, 1995b), 
make people Vezo. This particular way of construing group identity is 
routinely made available and relevant to children. Thus, whenever a child 
demonstrates that she has learnt a new skill – for example, swimming or 
catching a fish – she will be praised that she is becoming Vezo; by contrast, 
whenever a child fails to perform like a Vezo – for example, if she struggles to 
eat a bony fish – she will be teased that she is Masikoro (the name of the 
Vezo’s agriculturalist neighbours). Given the heavily weighted testimony they 
hear about how, by learning certain skills, one becomes or fails to become 
Vezo, we can understand why Vezo adolescents should pay particular attention 
to the ways in which skills are transmitted and acquired, and why the notion 
that skills are learnt through practice and habituation is the first one they come 
to master and subsequently recruit in theory building. 
The existing evidence therefore suggests that the emphasis on the 
acquisition of skills as the constituent of group identity might guide Vezo 
children’s conceptual development in culturally specific ways. Of course, to 
validate this hypothesis we would need comparative data from distinctively 
different cultural contexts, for example from societies where the inheritance of 
a certain kind of blood or of a certain kind of bones is taken to mediate 
people’s affiliation to specific descent or ethnic groups. The prediction would 
be that in such contexts children would come to realize the significance of birth 
origins in the transmission of bodily traits before they understand the role of 
learning and habituation in the acquisition of skills.  
                                                 
14 Their mean percentage of birth judgments for skills (25) was no different from that of adults (24). 
15 Their mean percentage of birth judgments for beliefs (58) was no different from chance. 
16 Their mean percentage of birth judgments on bodily properties (69) was different from chance but 
was significantly different from the percentage of birth judgments (94) given by those adolescents who 
showed a Differentiated Pattern. 
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To recap: the findings of the study among Vezo children, adolescents and 
adults indicate that the construction of the concepts of birth parentage and 
biological inheritance takes a considerable time; when placed in a comparative 
perspective, the findings also indicate that the pace of development is sensitive 
to the cultural, social and educational environments in which children happen 
to grow up; when analyzed against the backdrop of the Vezo theory of group 
identity, they suggest that the specific steps taken by Vezo children as they 
construct these concepts might also be context-dependent.  
Taken together, these results challenge the hypothesis that concepts such as 
biological inheritance and birth parentage are part of children’s innate 
conceptual repertoire, and suggest instead that these concepts emerge after a 
prolonged constructive process, whose pace and trajectory are sensitive to the 
culturally specific conditions in which development unfolds. Nonetheless, 
despite their significance, these conditions only affect the pace and trajectory 
of conceptual development, not its overall end-point. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has pitted the anthropological study of cultural representations, 
assumed by most anthropologists to be historically specific and unconstrained 
in their variability, against the psychological study of innate representational 
constraints, assumed by some psychologists to guide conceptual development 
towards cross-cultural convergence in core domains of knowledge. More 
specifically, this paper has pitted the ethnographic account of how Vezo adults 
in Madagascar describe the processes by which babies come to resemble 
people other than their birth parents against the claim that the development of 
concepts of birth parentage and biological inheritance is guided by innate 
constraints. Once woven together, the two accounts raise issues of theoretical 
import for both the anthropological study of culture and the psychological 
study of cognition and cognitive development.  
On the one hand – the anthropological hand—the discovery that Vezo 
adults know that their babies get their physiognomy from their birth parents, 
but choose to state otherwise, raises the question of what kind of knowledge is 
accessed by ethnographic methods. Clearly, Vezo adults are much more 
interested in articulating the knowledge that helps them create the kind of 
moral world in which children are generated, nurtured and moulded by a large 
network of relations, than they are in discussing their understanding of the 
mechanism of biological inheritance. As ethnographers, we are unlikely to find 
evidence of the latter, while we are likely to be seduced by the radical 
ontological incommensurability implied by the former. And yet, the 
collaboration with cognitive psychologists and the deployment of a simple 
experimental tool that targets people’s inferential reasoning rather than 
engaging them in a moral discourse, has revealed that in fact Vezo adults take 
for granted the constraints imposed on human relations by the biological facts 
of reproduction. As ethnographers, we witness their efforts to transcend these 
constraints,17 and we should strive to represent them for what they are: efforts 
to work against the ties of biological kinship, to attenuate the difference 
between birth and nurture, to erase the “signs” that only birth parents can leave 
on their children.  
                                                 
17 See Firth, 1963: 190-93 for a similar point regarding the Tikopia practice of “the adhering child”. 
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On the other hand – the psychological hand – the discovery that conceptual 
development in the domain of folkbiology is highly sensitive to the cultural 
and educational environment in which children grow up, even when its 
outcome is cross-culturally convergent, raises the question of what kind of 
comparative evidence psychologists should be seeking and what kind of theory 
they should be articulating to do justice to the fact that the cultural context in 
which conceptual development unfolds is unlikely to ever be just an 
independent variable.  
Having discovered that Vezo adults understand the process of biological 
inheritance, psychologists might be tempted to treat the local notion that babies 
do not resemble their birth parents as inessential cultural fluff that can be 
disregarded in the study of Vezo cognition. This, however, would be a serious 
mistake, not just because the Vezo notion is imbued with moral value and 
clearly matters to the people concerned, but also because it is the outcome of a 
fundamental characteristic of human cognition – what Sperber calls our 
metarepresentational ability (e.g., Sperber 1994, 1997). It is this ability that 
allows Vezo adults to do more than represent the world as it is known to them. 
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